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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over
this domestic relations child custody matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (Supp. 1989).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 30-3-5, 1953 as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Defendant/Appellant (Scott Smith) seeks to modify the
Decree of Divorce by first attempting to show a substantial change
of circumstances for purposes of changing child custody; and that
it is in the best interest and welfare of the child to modify the
1

Decree of Divorce.
B.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The Honorable Ray M. Harding, in an Order of the Fourth
Judicial District Court, ruled that Scott Smith's Petition to
Modify the Decree of Divorce was to be dismissed in that there was
not a showing of substantial and material change of circumstances
to warrant a change of custody.
Prior to the trial, a Motion in Limine was granted to
restrict

evidence prior

to December

14, 1984, pertaining

to

matters which were previously litigated before the Court in an
Order to Show Cause hearing in re contempt.
C.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND RELEVANT FACTS

On April 13, 1981, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, of
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, entered a
Decree of Divorce

to the captioned

parties thereby

granting

custody of the parties minor child, Jesse, to Patricia Taylor. (R.
15-16).

The Defendant Scott Smith was not present at the hearing

as he had executed a Consent and Waiver for Entry of Judgment
which had been duly filed with the Court.

Scott Smith executed

this Consent and Waiver through an attorney and acknowledged that
he had been given the opportunity to consult with an attorney
prior to its execution. (R. 5-6).
In the Consent and Waiver, Scott Smith consents that his
2

default may be entered consistent with the provisions contained in
the Amended Complaint which states that the Plaintiff

(Patricia

Taylor) is a fit and proper parent and should be awarded the sole
care and custody of the minor child of the parties. (R. 1-3).
On August 21r 1981, the Honorable Maurice Harding of the
Fourth

Judicial District

Court entered

an Order

Modifying

the

Decree (R. 27-28) which specifically defined Scott's visitation.
This Order

was a result

of

the Court's holding

a hearing

on

Scott's Motion for Order to Show Cause filed July 20f 1981. (R.
19).

The purpose of this Order to Show Cause was to further

establish visitation rights.
A subsequent Order to Show Cause hearing was heard on
August 6, 1982/ before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, resulting
in an Order

dated

the 17th day

of August,

1982, wherein

the

Defendant was ordered to pay to the Clerk of the Court the sum of
ONE

HUNDRED

TWENTY-FIVE

DOLLARS

($125.00)

per

month

for

support and maintenance of the minor child of the parties.
money

was

to

be

held

until

the

Court

directed

its

the
Such

further

disposition. (R. 79-80).
On August 15, 1984, an Order to Show Cause was issued on
the Defendant Scott Smith's behalf
finding

the Plaintiff

(R. 91) for the purposes of

in contempt of court, and to modify the

Decree of Divorce to specify visitation rights including locations
3

and

times

where

the

child

could

be picked

parties for the Defendant's visitation.

up by

appropriate

Complications regarding

visitation had resulted due to the Plaintiff and the minor child
moving to Mexico and then to Arizona.

(R.89-90).

The hearing on October 3, 1984, was continued to a later
date due to the Plaintiff acquiring new counsel and due to her
medical situation at that time. (R. 98-100).
The hearing on Defendant's Order to Show Cause was held
December 11, 1984, where both parties were present.

On December

14, 1984, Judge Bullock entered an Order Modifying Decree which
set forth the Defendant's visitation rights in greater detail.
The Court further found the Plaintiff to be in contempt of court
for violating both the spirit and language of the Order regarding
visitation.

The Court further found that the Plaintiff may purge

herself of said contempt by engaging in a course of conduct which
will affirmatively effectuate the Defendant's visitation schedule.
(R. 158-166).
In the Order Modifying Decree, dated December 14f 1984,
the Court modified paragraph 5 of the original Decree of Divorce
providing that the Defendant Scott G. Smith be awarded certain
custodial and visitation rights. (R.163-164).

This was not for

the purpose of diluting the Plaintiff Patricia Taylor's custody
nor

"to

give

joint

custody

as
4

joint

custody

is

generally

understood."
custodial

(Tr. 577).

rights

to

The apparent purpose of awarding such

the

Defendant

was

to

assist

him

in

effectuating his visitation schedule from the Mexican authorities.
(R. 130-133).
During the process of these Order to Show Cause hearings
resulting in different Orders Modifying the Decree/ the Defendant
never petitioned the Court to award a change of custody of Jesse,
nor tried to show a material change of circumstances which would
justify a change of custody.
On June
original

suit

2, 1988, Patricia Taylor

affecting

the

parent/child

filed

in Texas an

relationship

as

it

relates to visitation and a temporary restraining order relating
to the terms and conditions of this visitation.

The temporary

restraining order was filed on June 6, 1988, and a hearing was
scheduled in Texas for June 21, 1988. (R. 283-290).
On June 20, 1988, a conference call was held between
Lupi Eggemeyer, Court Master for County Court at Law #5, El Paso,
Texas, and Judge Ray Harding of the Utah County Court in Provo,
Utah.

It was mutually agreed upon that Scott Smith and Patricia

Taylor were to be permanently

restrained from engaging

psychological

brain

manipulation

or

washing

of

Jesse.

in any
The

visitation schedule was ordered to continue as set forth in the
Utah Order. (R. 304-305).

5

On June 21, 1988, the Defendant

filed a Petition

to

Modify Decree of Divorce for the purpose of awarding a change of
custody

of

Jesse

from

the

Plaintiff

to

the

Defendant.

The

Petition states that the actions of contemptuous behavior of the
Plaintiff

constitutes a material change of circumstances which

would justify awarding a change of custody. (R. 294-298).
On July 27, 1988, Patricia Taylor through Utah counsel
filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings stating that custody should be
determined in Texas pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 45(c), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended. (R. 306-313)..
On
Memorandum
finding

September
Decision

that

15,

denying

jurisdiction

1988,
the
over

Judge

Motion
the

Harding
to

Stay

custody

of

entered

a

Proceedings,
Jesse

Smith

continued to rest in the State of Utah. (R. 359).
On December 9, 1988, Patricia Taylor filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment with regard to Defendant's Petition to Modify the
Decree of Divorce to change the custody of Jesse.
conference prior

In an informal

to trial, the Court denied such a Motion for

Summary Judgment on the grounds that there were material issues of
fact which remained to be determined. (R. 405).
On December

12, 1988, the Plaintiff made a Motion in

Limine to prohibit the introduction of evidence prior to December
14, 1984, since such evidence had previously been litigated before
6

the Court on December 11, 1984, which resulted in Plaintiff being
held in contempt of court.

(R. 419-420).

Judge Harding granted

such Motion in Limine on December 13, 1988. (R. 405-406).
Trial was held on December 13f 1988, after which Judge
Harding granted Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss in that there was
not a material change of circumstances proven in order for the
Court to shift custody to the Defendant. (R. 425-427).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
When
Judicata

as

determined,

there has been an adjudication,
to

or

those
upon

issues

all

which

issues

were

which

the

it becomes Res

either
party

tried
had

a

and
fair

opportunity to present and have determined in other proceedings.
On

January

27,

represented by an attorney

1981,

Defendant

Scott

Smith,

being

entered into a Stipulation for divorce

consenting that custody be awarded to Plaintiff who was "a fit and
proper parent".

A Decree of Divorce was subsequently entered on

April 13, 1981.

On August 21, 1981, some four (4) months after

the entry of the Decree of Divorce, an Order to Show Cause hearing
was

held

upon which

the Court modified

Defendant's visitation.

the Decree

specifying

Defendant was again in Court on August 6,

1982, for an Order to Show Cause hearing, being represented by
counsel, of which further evidence was produced.
later, December

Two (2) years

11, 1984, and after an extensive hearing, the
7

Court

again modified

Defendant's

the Decree of Divorce

visitation

rights;

and

after

further

hearing

specifying
all

of

the

evidence the Court held Plaintiff in contempt of Court and entered
an Order dated December 14/ 1989/ in which Plaintiff was entitled
to purge herself by future conduct.
In 1988 when Defendant petitioned
modify

the

Decree

of

Divorce,

the

Court

the Court
properly

to again
granted

Plaintiff's Motion in Limine preventing the presentation of the
same evidence

that had previously been litigated

in the 1981/

1982/ and 1984 hearings for the purpose of showing a substantial
change of circumstances.

Defendant had the opportunity of asking

the Court to change custody in 1984 and have the evidence that was
presented considered as to whether it constituted a substantial
change of circumstances.

Having had that opportunity, he chose

only to have it presented for the purpose of a contempt citation.
To permit the Defendant
that was presented

to present

the same evidence

in 1981/ 1982/ and 1984 for the purpose of

permitting Defendant to carry his burden of showing a substantial
change of circumstances flies in the face of the doctrine of res
judicata.

Those facts have been judicially acted upon once, and

the Court properly precluded those same facts to be relitigated on
a different claim.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
FACTS PRIOR TO DECEMBER 14, 1934, PROPERLY EXCLUDED
ON THE BASIS OF BEING RES JUDICATA
Since

thp

r

parties

unable to agree ^..i. regard iu ui*e visitation

have

been

the •: h 11 d , Jesse.

This has required f'wo hearings and in December of 1984f a lengthy
evidentiary hearing took plao
substantial

<•'.

evidence

expe

*rhu'ii trie Defendant presented
regard

us child.

to

the

displeasures

he

His evidence was convincing

enough that the Plaint i:r was held in con tempi of Cuurt and given
the opportunity r.. p..:-^e herself by conduct in the future.

The

relief

and

Defends

.

11 December of

specificity with regard r.-. fir *re visit-aM

1984 was contempt,
i riejtitb,

Pot whatever

reason he c. ' not choose to seek a change of custody.
1
barring t"1

doctrine of res ludicata has a dua. purpose in (1)
prosecution of. a second action upon • - - dine olaim,

demand, 01 uause of actior

3 preclude ; >

of particular" facts ru" is:: ••

relitigation

nother action between the same

parties on a different claim or cause of action. -Hi AmJur^nd sec.
39 4,
Res judicata, has the two branches of claim, preclusion
and issue preclusion.

Claim preclusion prohibits the relit iqa+ ion

9

of claims which have previously been litigated between the same
parties, and also prevents claims which "could and should have
been litigated in the prior action, but were not raised."

Masters

v. Worsley, 777 P2d 121, 503 (Utah App. 1989); Copper State Thrift
and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P2d 387, 389

(Utah App. 1987).

Issue

preclusion (collateral estoppel) applies when the issues have been
"competently, fully and fairly litigated" in the "context of a
different cause of action."

Id.

The Utah Court of Appeals recently outlined the doctrine
of

res

judicata

in

divorce

actions.

In

Throckmorton

v.

Throckmorton, 767 P2d 121 (Utah App. 1988) the Court stated:
"When there has been an adjudication, it becomes
res judicata as to those issues which were either
tried and determined, or upon all issues which the
party had a fair opportunity to present and have
determined in the other proceedings."
Because the Defendant has fully litigated

Plaintiff's

behavior prior to December of 1984, the Court properly ruled that
its relitigation should be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
The Defendant Scott Smith, at the time of the contempt hearing had
ample opportunity to show that there was a substantial change of
circumstances and ask for a change of custody and a modification
of the original Decree of Divorce but he chose not to do so.
The

Defendant

Scott

Smith

wants

the

opportunity

of

relitigating all of his previous evidence that was heard in the
10

contempt proceeding.

He now urges upon the Court that SII

in i t J ally entered a consent and waiver
never heard evidence with ;c^ •
of the child
yean:; f: - ^

This p o i u

that the Court, has really
tjest i interest and welfare

;s not wei.i raken since it is eight (8)

- lime that the divorce was heard and tuur (4) years

since the evidence he wants to r e I 11.1 qaU,» wa:,;j i:.resent ed ,
The Defendant relies on Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P2d b99 (Utah
1989) whicl I states ttidi

the res judicata aspect of the strict

"changed circumstances" rule ot the Hogge t wu-prongtMi tesl IinIS r Be
"subservient to the best interest of •"•.** child."
Hogge v.
Court

Hogge,

pointed

•:

."M O I lUtau iio<?:

out that

adjudicated

where

custody

ustody award made I

by stipula* .

deter
i

IeL_ at bOJ. See
In Elmer , the
.*t , ns

tn« M »

*:auR divorce case

?s jtitli cat*: p< .icy underlying the ehanged-

circumstances rule is at a particula, v low ebb."

Elmer ,

in that case however, there were no subsequent hearings (as ,i uie
present case) of whu, h the pi.i»*?")i^ seek i mj u.) change custod'
ampul opportunity to show a material change of

r^aa

a-

I. he purpose of changing custody.
The
claim

riaiiii i I I , l\i! i l»'M Tdyl -i . does not necessarily

res judicata

to the facts stipulated

I IO in t :he default

lecree, but to the facts litigated in subsequent hearings
prior

L C December

14 r 1984,

r

'he..-~:

.e strict

"changed

circumstances"

rule

of

the

Hogge

two-pronged

test

is

still

applicable.

provides

Sec.

30-3-5, Utah

that

the

Court

Code

has

Annotated,

continuing

1953

as

amended,

jurisdiction

to

make

subsequent changes or new orders for the support and maintenance
of the parties, the custody of the children and their support,
maintenance,

health,

and

dental

care, or

the distribution

of

property as is reasonable and necessary.
Pursuant

to this language, the Court may modify

Divorce Decree "as shall be reasonable and necessary".

the

Because of

a variety of circumstances in domestic disputes, "no firm rule can
be

uniformly

determined

applied

upon

the

in

all

basis

of

divorce
the

cases

immediate

and

each

fact

must

be

situation".

Hunsaker v. Fake, 563 P2d 784 (Utah 1977); Wilson v. Wilson, 5
Utah2d 79, 82; 296 P2d 977, 979 (1956).
Allowing the past contempt proceedings to be reentered
which has already been adjudicated would not enable the Court to
determine a substantial change of circumstances "on the basis of
the immediate fact situation".

The Court specifically found that

Plaintiff's conduct has improved

since she was found to be in

contempt of Court although such improvements were not deemed
sufficient to constitute purging herself of that conduct.

Thus,

the contempt proceeding is moot, it is res judicata, and it was
12

totally proper not to al 1 ow the same pvi
on

the

question

of

whether

or

- - -

n.-.

substantia

, -

^nange

circumstances had oeeiii red.
A two prong test, has been established mi
the request to change custody awards.

This test

considering

is enunciated

basically in two cases, Hogge v. Hogge, 849 P2d 51 (uiar L98 2) and
Becker v. Becker, 694 P2d 608 (Utah 1984).

The test was recent I y

out J I ned in Kramei v, Kramer, 738 P2d 624 (Utah 1987).

In Kramer

the Court stated:
"Under the first prong, the parties seeking
modification must show that there has been a change
in the circumstances upon which the original
custody award was based which substantially and
materially effects the custodial parents parenting
ability or the functioning of the custodial
relationship which justifies reopening the custody
question.
Once
a
substantial
change
of
circumstances has been established, the petitioner
must show under the second prong that the requested
change in custody is in the best interest of the
child."
The purpose of the two part Hogge test is founded upon
the

premise

that

stable

custody

arrangements

importance i >« * «M-» n n M ' s proper development.

are of

critical

In the Kramer case

(supra, at 628) the court stated:
"For this reason, whei i the trial court is asked to
determine whether there has been a change of
circumstances sufficient to warrant the reopening
of the custody Decree, ordinarily it must focus
exclusively on the parenting ability of the
custodial parent and the functioning of the
established custodial relationship,"

In

Becker

(supra,

at

610)

the

Court

held

that

the

standard requires that:
"the asserted change in circumstances have some
material relationship to and substantial effect
upon parenting ability for the functioning of the
presently existing custodial relationship."
The Court was therefore not only proper in ruling that
the pre-December 14, 1984, evidence was barred by the doctrine of
res judicata, the trial court should also be affirmed on the basis
that pre-December 14, 1984, evidence could have no relationship to
immediate

fact

situation,

nor could

it be material as

to the

presently existing custodial relationship.

CONCLUSION
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT EVIDENCE PRESENTED
IN A PRIOR CONTEMPT HEARING SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED
TO BE RELITIGATED AT A SUBSEQUENT HEARING FOR THE
PURPOSE OF SHOWING A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
Appellant's

points

are

not

well

taken

because

the

evidence presented at the December 14, 1984, hearing should not be
relitigated for the purposes of showing a substantial change of
circumstances in 1988.

Such evidence was properly precluded for

the following reasons:
1.
2.

Res judicata;
A

determination

of

substantial

change

of

circumstances should be based on an immediate fact situation; and
3. Pre-December 14, 1984, conduct would be contrary

14

to showing
ability

a substantial

01

functioning

change of circumstances
of

the

presently

on paiem u\q

existing

custodial

relationship.
DATED this

day of November, 1989.
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TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
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